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ABSTRACT 
 
The risk of receiving cell-phone spam—in the form of unsolicited 
text messages—grows as advertisers increasingly target cell-phone users. 
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) clearly 
prohibits unsolicited telephone calls made by an automated telephone 
dialing system (ATDS) without the recipient’s express prior consent. 
But until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Satterfield v. Simon & 
Schuster, it was unclear how TCPA applied to text messages. Simon 
& Schuster argued their text messages were not “calls” under the 
TCPA and were not sent by an ATDS. The Ninth Circuit disagreed 
and held a text message is a “call.” The court also held an ATDS 
means any equipment with capacity to store or dial random or 
sequential telephone numbers, regardless of whether such calls were 
actually made. This sweeping rule arguably applies to any computer. 
The court also adopted narrow legal definitions of “brand” and 
“affiliate” that could hinder any business seeking third-party 
advertisers to send messages on its behalf. This Article explores how 
Satterfield exposes mobile advertisers to significantly increased liability. 
                                                                                                             
* Gareth S. Lacy, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2011. 
Thank you Professor Jane K. Winn of the University of Washington School of Law 
and Thomas Hackett, Article Editor, for offering valuable feedback. Thank you also 
to Matthew Staples, Associate, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, for sharing his 
expertise in this area of law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2004 Laci Satterfield downloaded a free ringtone for her eight-
year-old son’s cell phone from www.nextones.com.1 Two years later 
publishing giant Simon & Schuster launched an advertising campaign 
using text messages to promote Stephen King’s latest horror novel, 
Cell. 2 The company outsourced the advertising to ipsh!, Inc. (ipsh!), a 
mobile marketing firm with 100,000 cell-phone numbers purchased 
from various Web sites including Nextones.3 
At half-past midnight on January 18, 2006, Satterfield’s son 
                                                                                                             
1 Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2009); Brief 
for Defendants-Apellees at 4., Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946 
(9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-16356), 2007 WL 4856754. 
2 Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Stephen King Tries to Ring Up Book Sales, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 23, 2006, at B1. (King’s book is about a supernatural force transforming the 
world’s cell-phone users into flesh-eating zombies.) See Janet Maslin, Invasion of 
the Ring Tone Snatchers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at E1 available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2006/01/23/books/23masl.html.  
3 Before downloading the ringtone, Satterfield had checked a box next to the 
following statement: “Yes! I would like to receive promotions from Nextones affi-
liates and brands. Please note, that by declining you may not be eligible for our FREE 
content. By checking Submit, you agree that you have read and agreed to the Terms 
and Conditions.” Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, 569 F.3d at 949. 
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received Simon & Schuster’s text-message advertisement:  
The next call you take may be your last . . . Join the 
Stephen King VIP Mobile Club at www.cellthebook. 
com. RplySTOP2OptOut. PwdbyNexton.4 
The message terrified the young boy. Satterfield wrote “STOP” in 
response. Then she sued Simon & Schuster and ipsh!5 for sending an 
unsolicited text-message advertisement in violation of the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).6 She later sought to certify 
a class of 60,000 people who received similar messages.7 
Simon & Schuster moved for summary judgment by arguing: 
TCPA did not apply because text messages were not “calls,” the 
messages were not sent by a prohibited ATDS, and Satterfield 
consented to receive promotions from Nextones affiliates and brands.8 
The district court ruled for Simon & Schuster.9 But the Ninth Circuit 
reversed and held: (1) a text message is a “call” under TCPA; (2) an 
ATDS is any equipment with capacity to store, produce, or call 
random or sequential numbers; and (3) Simon & Schuster was not an 
“affiliate” or “brand” of Nextones and therefore Satterfield did not 
consent to receive the text-message advertising.10 The decision 
reinstated Satterfield’s effort to certify a $90-million class action 
lawsuit.11  
This Article will describe the laws regulating text-message 
                                                                                                             
4 Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 949. 
5 Corrected Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 1, Satterfield v. 
Simon & Schuster, Inc., No. C 06-2893 CW (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2007), 2006 WL 
1787153, rev’d, 569 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2009).  
6 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006) et seq. 
7 First Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, 
Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., No. 406CV02893 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 17, 2009), 
2009 WL 3441944; 9th Cir. Hangs Up on Text Message Spam, 16 No. 7 ANDREWS 
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 23 (Aug. 19, 2009). 
8 Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 950. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 951, 952, 955. 
11 9th Cir. Hangs Up on Text Message Spam, 16 No. 7 ANDREWS CLASS ACTION 
LITIG. REP. 23 (Aug. 19, 2009). 
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advertising and will explore how Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster exposes 
mobile advertisers to liability under TCPA. In particular, the court’s 
broad definition of a prohibited ATDS—any computer with capacity to 
generate random numbers—may further restrict text-message market-
ing. The court’s definitions of “affiliate” and “brand” may also dis-
courage the use of plain language in terms and conditions displayed to 
consumers visiting Web sites. 
 
I. TEXT-MESSAGE ADVERTISING AND MOBILE SPAM PREVALENCE 
 
Text messaging, or short message service (SMS), allows cell-phone 
users to send and receive 160-character text-only messages.12 Carriers 
charge per text message or offer monthly flat rates.13 SMS supports 
sending messages phone-to-phone or Internet-to-phone.14 Phone-to-
phone messages are directed to cell-phone numbers. Internet-to-phone 
messaging allows users to send their message to an e-mail address as-
signed by the wireless carrier; the carrier then converts this e-mail into 
a text message.15  
Text messaging is big business. In 2008 American cell-phone users 
sent an average of seven billion text messages per month, up 20 
percent from 2007.16 The mobile advertising market, including text-
                                                                                                             
12 The European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) first developed 
an SMS technical standard in the early 1990s. Today the Third Generation Part-
nership Project (3GPP) develops and maintains an SMS standard inter-nationally. See 
3rd Generation Partnership Project, Technical Realization of Short Message Service 
(SMS), Technical Report 3GPP TS 23.040, http://www.3g pp.org/specification-
numbering (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). 
13 Steven Masur & John Maher, Mobile Phone Text Message Spam: Building A 
Vibrant Market for Mobile Advertising While Keeping Customers Happy, 7 VA. SPORTS & 
ENT. L. J. 41, 44-45 (2007). 
14 Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Co., 121 P.3d 831, 837-38 (2005). 
15 Every cell-phone number has an e-mail address that is typically the user’s cell-
phone number and the wireless carrier’s domain address. For example, the AT&T 
cell-phone number (783) 836-5464 would have an e-mail address: 7838365464@att. 
wireless.net. E-mails sent to that address would be converted to text message and 
then delivered to the user’s cell phone. See Joffe, 121 P.3d at 837-38. 
16 Liz Farmer, Conn.-based Vesta Mobile hoping u r ready 4 txt msg mrktng, DAILY 
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message marketing, is projected to be worth $12 billion by 2011.17 Text 
messaging is now more popular than cell phone calls.18 
A broad range of technology providers are involved in creating, 
processing, and distributing text-message advertising.19 In Satterfield, for 
example, five companies accessed Satterfield’s phone number before 
she received the text-message advertisement.20 In an effort to self-
regulate, more than 600 carriers, advertisers, manufacturers, and soft-
ware providers formed the Mobile Marketing Association (MMA) in 
2000 to issue voluntary best practices guidelines for the mobile 
advertising industry.21  
Despite these efforts, private lawsuits alleging spam text messaging 
(also known as wireless spam, cellular spam, mobile spam or m-spam) 
                                                                                                             
REC. (Baltimore), Mar. 27, 2008, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_qn4183/is_20080327/ai_n24975493. 
17 Susan Moore, Gartner Says Telecom Carriers Are Well Placed to Win Advertising 
Revenue if They Overcome Key Challenges, GARTNER NEWSROOM, Aug. 26, 2008, 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=747112. 
18 Priya Ganapati, Texting Finally More Popular Than Calling Among U.S. Mobile 
Users, WIRED, Sep. 22, 2008, http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2008/09/us-finally-
catc/. 
19 Linda A. Goldstein, Mobile Advertising and Web 2.0, 962 PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 
315, 324 (2009); see also MOBILE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, UNDERSTANDING  
MOBILE MARKETING: TECHNOLOGY & REACH (May 2007), available at http:// 
www.mmaglobal.com/uploads/MMAMobileMarketing102.pdf.  
20 Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 950 (9th Cir. 2009). 
First, Nextones sold customer phone numbers to MIA. MIA then sold those 
numbers to ipsh!, the mobile advertising company Simon & Schuster hired. 
Employees at ipsh! wrote the text messages for Simon & Schuster and converted 
them to a file format deliverable to wireless carriers. Those files—embedded with tele-
phone numbers—were sent to mBlox, a mobile transaction networking service 
company or “aggregator.” (Aggregators combine, on one network, all direct com-
munications to wireless carriers.) mBlox transmitted the messages to carriers that 
routed them to customers. See generally Eric Goldman, Ninth Circuit Revives TCPA 
Claim--Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG,  
July 3, 2009, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/07/ninth_circuit _r.htm 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
21 MOBILE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, U.S. CONSUMER BEST PRACTICES 
GUIDELINES VERSION 5.0 (June 1, 2010), http://www.mmaglobal.com/bestprac-
tices.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES].  
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continue to target mobile advertisers.22 American cell-phone users 
received 1.5 billion spam messages in 2008—a 37 percent increase from 
the 1.1 billion messages received in 2007.23 
 
II. HOW SATTERFIELD RESTRICTS MOBILE ADVERTISING 
 
Two federal laws regulate text-message advertising: (1) TCPA24 and 
its FCC regulations25; and (2) the Controlling the Assault of Non-
Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM)26 and its FCC 
regulations.27 TCPA permits private lawsuits28 and does not preempt 
state anti-spam laws.29 In contrast, CAN-SPAM generally prohibits 
private lawsuits30 and preempts most state law.31 Satterfield ultimately 
                                                                                                             
22 Jack Gordon, FDCPA and Other Consumer Rights Lawsuit Statistics, WEBRECON 
LLC, Jan. 7, 2010, http://webrecon.com/news/?p=131; Bridget M. O’Neill, Wireless 
Spam This Way Comes: An Analysis of the Spread of Wireless Spam and Proposed Measures 
to Stop It, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 229 (2003). 
23 Richi Jennings, SMS Text Message Spam is a Minor Problem, FERRIS RESEARCH 
BLOG, July 14, 2008, http://www.ferris.com/2008/07/14/sms-text-message-spam-is-a-
minor-problem/. Jennings argues U.S. cell-phone spam is still rare relative to other 
countries; approximately one-third of one percent of total U.S. messages were spam 
in 2007. But cell-phone spam has become a significant problem internationally. For 
example, 200 million Chinese cell-phone users received spam text messages in 2008. 
Beijing Investigates Spam Attack, BBC WORLD NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2 
/hi/business/7311242.stm (March 24, 2008); see also Terrence O’Brien, Text-Message 
Spam Continues to Grow Around the World, SWITCHED, May 4, 2009, http://www. 
switched.com/2009/05/04/text-message-spam-continues-to-grow-around-the-world/. 
24 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 
25 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2010). 
26 15 U.S.C. § 7712(b) (2006). 
27 47 C.F.R. § 64.3100 (2010). 
28 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006). 
29 47 U.S.C. § 227(e) (2006); see, e.g., Stenehjem v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 2006 ND 
84, 712 N.W.2d 828.  
30 FTC is vested with primary enforcement authority. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(a) 
(2006). State attorneys general also have civil enforcement power. 15 U.S.C.  
§ 7706(f)(1). And Internet providers may bring civil actions. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g). See 
generally, Gordon v. Virtumundo, 575 F.3d 1040, 1048 (2009). 
31 Decisions interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b) have found no preemption when 
the state law does not expressly regulate spam. See, e.g., Gordon v. Virtumundo, 575 
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rested its decision on TCPA. The court held a text message is a call 
under TCPA, equipment sending the message is prohibited if it has 
the capacity to dial randomly or sequentially, and consent to receive 
messages from an “affiliate” or “brand” is limited to corporate relation-
ships based on ownership or control.32 This holding will likely make 
lawful mobile advertising more difficult for businesses. 
 
A.  Text Messages Are Calls Under TCPA 
 
TCPA prohibits “any call . . . using any [ATDS] . . . to any tele-
phone number assigned to . . . a cellular telephone service . . .” unless 
the recipient gave prior express consent.33 TCPA does not define 
“call.” Satterfield affirmed a 2003 FCC determination that “call” means 
“both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers, including, for 
example, short messages service (SMS) calls . . .”34 While previous 
judicial decisions had reached similar conclusions, Satterfield is the first 
opinion to conduct a Chevron/Mead35 analysis determining the 
                                                                                                             
F.3d 1040, 1060-64 (2009); Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 
F.3d 348 (2006) (pre-empting only causes of action for immaterial misrepresentation, 
not falsity sounding in tort). In other words, CAN-SPAM does not preempt state laws 
prohibiting “falsity or deception.” See generally Katherine Wong, The Future of Spam 
Litigation After Omega World Travel v. Mummagraphics, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 459, 
469-72 (2007). 
32 Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 950; see generally The Complex Litigator, In Satterfield 
v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., Ninth Circuit defers to FCC and construes 
text messages as “calls” under TCPA, June 22, 2009, http://www.thecomplexlitiga 
tor.com/post-data/2009/6/22/in-satterfield-v-simon-schuster-inc-ninth-circuit-defers-
to.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2010). 
33 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (2006); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2010). 
34 In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14115 ¶ 165, 2003 WL 21517853 (2003) 
(Report and Order); see also Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 19 F.C.C.R. 15927, 15934 (2004) (confirming 
“prohibition on using [ATDS] to make calls to wireless phone numbers applies to 
text messages . . . as well as voice calls.”). 
35 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984); U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); see generally Evan J. 
Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U.L. REV. 1271 (2008); William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
 
 
7
Lacy: Mobile Marketing Derailed: How Curbing Cell-Phone Spam in <i>Satt
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2010
40 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [Vol. 6:1 
appropriate level of deference to give the FCC opinion.36   
Before Satterfield, defendants had argued messages sent Internet-to-
phone (e-mails converted into text messages) were not calls and 
therefore CAN-SPAM applied and prevented private lawsuits. For 
example in Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., the defendant argued TCPA 
did not apply because text messages were first e-mailed. But the Joffe 
Court rejected that argument and held TCPA also applies to text 
messages originally sent by e-mail: “[w]hether a text message is sent 
phone-to-phone or Internet-to-phone, the end result is the same.”37  
Satterfield affirmed this prohibition on Internet-to-phone messages 
also applies to text messages sent phone-to-phone. In part, Satterfield 
relied on the FCC’s determination that “it is unlawful to make any call 
using an [ATDS] . . . to any wireless telephone number . . . . This 
encompasses both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including, 
for example, short message service . . .”38 Joffe had cited the same FCC 
order, but had not conducted a Chevron/Mead analysis regarding the 
appropriate level of deference.39 Satterfield is therefore the first decision 
to do so. 
 First, Satterfield determined Congress intended an ordinary 
meaning of “to call”: “to communicate or try to get into communi-
cation with a person by telephone.”40 The court also noted the purpose 
                                                                                                             
& Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamden, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008).  
36 Two other decisions have followed Satterfield to affirm text messages are calls 
under TCPA. Abbas v. Selling Source, LLC, No. 09 CV 3413, 2009 WL 4884471 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2009) (reaching the same conclusion without Chevron deference); 
Lozano v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., No. 09-CV-6344, 2010 WL 1197884 
(N.D. Ill Mar. 23, 2010) (deferring to the FCC’s 2003 opinion).  
37 Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Co., 121 P.3d 831, 838 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
38 Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citing In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14115 (2003)) (emphasis added). 
39 Joffe, 121 P.3d at 837 n.6. 
40 Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 954 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 318 (2002)); accord Joffe, 121 P.3d at 835 (noting “when the word call is 
used as a verb, one of its most common meanings is to communicate or try to 
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of TCPA was to prohibit “communicat[ing] with others by telephone 
in a manner that would be an invasion of privacy” and “a voice 
message or a text message are not distinguishable in terms of being an 
invasion of privacy.”41 Next, the court found the FCC’s interpretation 
of “call” reasonable because it was consistent with the dictionary 
definition “that text messaging is a form of communication used 
primarily between telephones.”42 Applying Chevron, the court deferred 
to the FCC’s interpretation and therefore held a text message is a 
“call” under TCPA.43 
The court’s holding, that a text message is a call under TCPA, may 
increase the likelihood of mobile advertisers being found liable for 
text-message spam, but those following best practices guidelines should 
not be significantly affected.44 In particular, guidelines from MMA 
already prohibit sending unsolicited messages, require that consumers 
affirmatively opt-in, and mandate that all messages contain directions 
on how to opt-out.45 Moreover, selling mobile opt-in lists is 
prohibited.46 In sum, although text messages are now clearly calls, the 
best practices guidelines are largely consistent with TCPA rules 
governing such calls for advertising purposes. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
communicate with by tele-phone.”). While other courts have subsequently agreed a 
“text message” is a “call,” the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is somewhat problematic. In 
particular, the court relied on the verb form “to call” (“to communicate with or try to 
get into communi-cation . . . by a telephone”), but TCPA clearly uses “call” as a 
noun—“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to make any call . . . using any [ATDS] . . 
.” Compare Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 954 with 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
41 Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 954. 
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 William B. Baker & Scott D. Delacourt, Important Mobile Marketing 
Decision by the Ninth Circuit, http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=art 
icles &id=5271 (last visited Apr. 22, 2010). 
45 See GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 13-14, 16. 
46 Id. at 16. 
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B.  ATDS Means “Capacity” to Dial Randomly or Sequentially 
 
TCPA prohibits using an ATDS to call any cellular telephone 
service without express prior consent. Satterfield is the first circuit court 
decision construing the definition of an ATDS under TCPA. Based on 
the statute’s text, the court interpreted ATDS very broadly: 
“equipment which has the capacity to both (1) store or produce 
numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator 
and (2) to dial such numbers.”47  
Such a broad definition poses a serious challenge to mobile adver-
tisers because all computers arguably have the capacity to generate 
random numbers. Therefore, under Satterfield, a large portion of 
mobile marketers are potentially at risk. In response, advertisers 
formed the Mobile Advocacy Coalition (MAC) to lobby the FCC to 
protect underlying technology providers from liability based on 
Satterfield’s new definition of ATDS.48 Although the FCC’s 2003 
opinion49 suggested any capacity would be sufficient to render 
equipment an ATDS, such a broad interpretation might not be 
                                                                                                             
47 Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 949 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) (2006); 47 C.F.R.      
§ 64.1200(f)(1) (2010)) (emphasis added). The district court had held TCPA did not 
apply because Simon & Schuster’s messages were sent to a targeted list of numbers 
and therefore not randomly generated. But Satterfield found the district court had 
focused on the wrong issue: “[A] system need not actually store, produce, or call 
randomly or sequentially generated telephone numbers, it need only have the 
capacity to do it.” Id. at 951. 
48 Mobile Advocacy Coalition, Mobile Marketing: What’s At Stake & What 
We’re Doing About It, http://www.mobileac.org/2009/06/mobile-advocacy-
coalition.html (June 24, 2009, 1:59 PM EST). MAC plans to petition the FCC for an 
exemption from liability as “mere conduits” of advertising. This would amount to a 
finding that the “sender,” for TCPA liability purposes, is the user of the mass texting 
technology rather than the underlying technology provider. There is precedent for 
such exemptions: the FCC exempted carriers and fax broadcasters from liability as 
mere conduits. Cf. Portuguese Am. Leadership Council of the U.S., Inc. v. Investors’ 
Alert, Inc., 956 A.2d 671 (2008); Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 94 N.Y.2d 242 
(1999).  
49 In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14091-93, 2003 WL 21517853 (2003). 
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entitled to deference without formal notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.50 Nevertheless, MAC’s plans are nascent and therefore 
advertisers who have relied on their equipment not being an ATDS 
under TCPA should review their practices in light of Satterfield.  
One issue the Ninth Circuit did not reach was whether the 
equipment used to send the message to Satterfield actually dialed 
Satterfield’s number within the meaning of TCPA. TCPA does not 
define the word “dial.”51 The Joffe court had interpreted “dial” to mean 
“operate or manipulate a device in order to make or establish a 
telephone call or connection.”52 Joffe therefore concluded sending 
Internet-to-phone text messages was dialing because “[e]ven though 
Acacia used an attenuated method to dial a cellular telephone number, 
it nevertheless did so.”53 Advertisers using computers to send messages 
might consider raising this issue in an effort to mitigate Satterfield’s 
focus on capacity to dial random or sequential numbers. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
50 “An agency interpretation must be preceded by some minimum of process to 
merit deference; simple agency pronouncements, opinion letters, and policy 
statements fall below that minimum.” Abbas v. Selling Source, LLC, No. 09 CV 
3413 at *12, 2009 WL 4884471 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2009) (citing Krzalic v. Republic 
Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 2002)). The FCC’s original notice of proposed 
rulemaking only requested comments “on the various technologies used to dial 
telephone numbers . . . and whether an autodialer can generate phone calls from a 
database of existing numbers.” In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 17459, 17474, 2002 WL 31084939 
(Sept. 18, 2002). This notice arguably did not request comment on whether all 
systems with capacity to dial randomly or sequentially should be considered an 
ATDS. Therefore, to the extent the 2003 FCC opinion spoke to this issue, it may 
have done so without process. 
51 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
52 Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Co., 121 P.3d 831, 838 n.10 (2005) (citing 
WEBSTER’S NINTH COLLEGIATE 349 (1990)) (internal quotations omitted). 
53 Id. at 839. For a criticism of this view see J. Wesley Harned, Telemarketers Gone 
Mobile: The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 and Unsolicited Commercial Text 
Messages, 97 KY. L. J. 313, 330 (2009) (arguing text messages may not fall under 
TCPA because sending them does not involve dialing). 
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C.  “Affiliate” and “Brand” Defined Narrowly by Ownership and Control 
 
When Satterfield downloaded the ringtone onto her son’s cell 
phone, she consented to receive “promotions from Nextones affiliates 
and brands.”54 Satterfield held that Simon & Schuster was not an 
“affiliate” or “brand” of Nextones and therefore Satterfield did not 
consent to the text-message advertising. The court’s interpret-
ations of “affiliate” and “brand” impose narrow legal definitions on 
these terms that undermine the move to jargon-free Web site disclo-
sures. 
Simon & Schuster argued the various agreements between 
Nextones, MIA, and ipsh! permitted advertising to Satterfield. In 
particular, Nextones had licensed its subscribers’ telephone numbers, 
including Satter-field’s, to MIA. MIA then sold the numbers to ipsh!, 
Simon & Schuster’s advertiser.55 When ipsh! sent the message with the 
tag line “PwdbyNexton,” this was an attempt to label the advertisement 
as a Nextones message. Simon & Schuster argued it was therefore an 
affiliate of Nextones and was authorized to send the message: 
Thus, although Nextones shares no corporate structure 
with [Simon & Schuster] and is not a corporate 
“affiliate” in a strict legal sense, [Simon & Schuster] 
submit that the fact that Nextones licensed its 
subscriber list for use in this campaign constitutes the 
requisite degree of affiliation . . .56  
The court rejected this plain reading of “affiliate”—a meaning often 
employed in online terms and conditions in an effort to simplify 
language for consumers.57 Instead, Satterfield appears to have imposed 
                                                                                                             
54 Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2009). 
55 See supra note 20.  
56 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Satterfield v. Simon & 
Schuster, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 2893, (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2007) (No. 06-
2893 CW), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 35856. 
57 See generally Christina L. Kunz et al., Click-Through Agreements: Strategies for 
Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401, 410 (2001) (explaining 
terms should be clear and readable); accord FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, DOT 
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technical definitions of “affiliate” and “brand” taken from corporate 
governance and trademark law.58 
First, the Ninth Circuit found “[t]he term affiliate carries its own 
independent legal significance . . . [it] refers to a corporation that is 
related to another corporation by shareholding or other means of 
control . . .”59 The court therefore held Simon & Schuster was not an 
affiliate of Nextones because Nextones neither owned nor controlled 
Simon & Schuster.60 Second, the court imposed an equally technical 
definition of “brands” as “goods identified as being . . . of a single 
firm.”61 Satterfield did not consent on this basis either because the text 
message advertised a Simon & Schuster product, not a Nextones 
product. Furthermore, adding “PwdbyNexton” to the message did not 
transform Simon & Schuster into a Nextones affiliate or brand.62  
The court’s decision to impose technical definitions on terms and 
conditions may seriously restrict future efforts to conduct mobile 
advertising campaigns.63 For example, it is unclear how companies 
                                                                                                             
COM DISCLOSURES 14 (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/ecom 
merce/bus41.pdf (recommending clear language and syntax and avoiding legalese or 
technical jargon to make disclosures effective and understandable to consumers); 
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK 3 
(1998) available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf. 
58 See Goldman, supra note 20.  
59 Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 955 (quoting Delaware Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Christiana 
Care Health Servs., Inc., 892 A.2d 1073, 1077 (Del. 2006) (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 59 (7th ed. 1999))) (internal quotations omitted). 
60 Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 955.  
61 Id. at 955 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 268 
(2002)). 
62 Id. (“Nextones’s only role in this case was simply supplying the numbers to 
MIA, who in turn supplied the numbers to ipsh! The record also shows no agree-
ment between Nextones and Simon & Schuster.”). 
63 Ronnie London, Has The 9th Circuit Raised The Bar For Text-Message Affiliate 
Marketing? PRIVACY & SECURITY LAW BLOG, June 24, 2009, http://www.privsecb 
log.com/2009/06/articles/main-topics/marketing-consumer-privacy/has-the-9th-
circuit-raised-the-bar-for-textmessage-affiliate-marketing/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
For criticism of the lack of uniformity in privacy policies see Robert Sprague & 
Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying Information Through 
Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 124-33 (2009) 
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should now identify a third party on their Web site who markets to 
their customers; describing third parties as “affiliates” will no longer 
suffice. Moreover, companies can no longer insulate themselves from 
TCPA liability by stamping messages with the signature of the 
company that obtained the customer’s consent.64  
This decision also raises significant questions as to what constitutes 
adequate consent to receive messages. Under MMA best practices, 
Nextones would have been responsible for collecting user consent to 
receive promotions, and MIA would have been responsible for using 
that data in accordance with MMA guidelines.65 These guidelines for 
affiliate marketing would also have required Simon & Schuster be 
identified in the message and in opt-out language.66 It remains unclear, 
however, whether such disclosures are still sufficient after Satterfield. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Satterfield held unsolicited text messages sent by an ATDS are 
unlawful under TCPA because: (1) text messages are calls; (2) the 
system sending the messages is an ATDS if it has the capacity to 
generate numbers randomly or sequentially; and (3) the terms “affil-
iate” and “brand,” when used in online terms and conditions, are  
defined narrowly.  
The court’s definition of an ATDS presents a serious challenge to 
advertisers because all computers arguably have the capacity to generate 
random numbers. Furthermore, the decision’s narrow, technical 
definitions of “affiliate” and “brand” are troublesome because they 
may discourage plain language in online terms and conditions and 
make it difficult for future companies to hire third-party marketing 
                                                                                                             
(exploring collection and dissemination of personal identifying information and 
determining there is little regulation of online privacy policies). 
64 London, supra note 63.  
65 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Satterfield v. Simon & 
Schuster, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 2893, (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2007) (No. 06-
2893 CW), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 35856; GUIDELINES, supra note 21. 
66 GUIDELINES, supra note 21. 
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companies. Marketers using third-party lists of telephone numbers 
must therefore continue to obtain the appropriate warranties, cove-
nants, and indemnity provisions regarding how the numbers were 
collected, whether the third party is permitted to disclose the numbers, 
and the ability of marketers obtaining those numbers to use them. And 
companies hiring third-party marketing companies must ensure the 
customers who opted-in actually consented to receive text messages. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 When seeking consent from customers, ensure terms and condi-
tions identify exactly what the customer will receive and who will 
send it. Eschew the use of any terms that have vague or ambiguous 
meanings such as “brand” or “affiliate” in favor of more precise 
terms such as “third parties.” 
 Do not send text messages to customers who did not expressly con-
sent to receive messages. 
 Identify all companies that have access to a customer’s phone 
number and ensure each has complied with any restrictions on the 
customer’s express consent. 
 Vendors providing lists of phone numbers to marketers that will 
use the numbers to send text messages should ensure appropriate 
contractual terms and conditions govern the marketers’ uses.  
 Marketers that obtain phone numbers from vendors should nego-
tiate appropriate representations, warranties, and indemnities 
regarding the scope of consent that vendors obtained from 
consumers. 
15
Lacy: Mobile Marketing Derailed: How Curbing Cell-Phone Spam in <i>Satt
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2010
